> ## Documentation Index
> Fetch the complete documentation index at: https://docs.rotavision.com/llms.txt
> Use this file to discover all available pages before exploring further.

# Certification

> A signed, RBI-mapped fit-for-production certificate for an agent, produced by running a battery over the evidence Sakshi already holds — red-team, fairness, evaluation gates, formally-verified autonomy policy, verified identity. Optionally required before an agent can be activated.

No agent should reach production without a governance sign-off. Certification is
that sign-off, made verifiable: a battery of checks over the evidence Sakshi
already holds for a candidate agent, aggregated into a scored verdict and an
Ed25519-signed certificate with an expiry — each check mapped to the regulatory
obligation it satisfies.

Certification is **evidence-first**: it reads evidence already on the chain, it
never drives the agent.

## The battery

A certification run assembles the checks other parts of Sakshi produce:

* **Autonomy envelope** — the agent's policy is formally verified (no dead rules,
  no escalation that routes higher stakes to *less* oversight). RBI MRM bounded
  autonomy.
* **Verified identity** — a cryptographically verified agent identity (KYA / SEBI
  Reg 16C).
* **Independent validation** — evaluation gates cleared on the confidence-interval
  lower bound, not a point estimate. RBI MRM independent validation.
* **Red-team** — an adversarial evaluation within the attack-success ceiling. RBI
  MRM red-teaming.
* **Fairness** — a declared-first bias screen with no flagged cohort. DPDP /
  fair-lending.

## The verdict

A hard check that fails **denies** the certificate; a missing hard check leaves
the agent **incomplete** (you cannot certify what was never tested); all hard
checks passing is **certified**. The certificate carries the per-check results,
the clause mapping, an expiry, and a signature over the exact bytes — anyone can
verify it without trusting Sakshi.

```bash theme={null}
# run the battery over a candidate agent
curl -X POST https://YOUR_HOST/api/v1/certify/runs \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"agent_id": "AGENT_ID"}'

# the latest certificate for an agent, and its signed export
GET /api/v1/certify/agents/{agent_id}/latest
GET /api/v1/certify/runs/{id}/export
```

## The gate

Set `SAKSHI_REQUIRE_CERT` and an agent cannot be activated without a valid,
unexpired certificate — certification becomes required infrastructure in your
deployment pipeline. A denied or expired agent is refused activation, with the
reason on record.

## Re-certification

A certificate has a shelf life. Certifying an agent schedules its
re-certification at the certificate's expiry, and events that invalidate its
assumptions — a model change, or a [silent behavioural change](/concepts/silent-change) —
flag it for re-certification immediately. This is the loop that closes the
[governed-agent lifecycle](/concepts/guardian): certify before ship, watch in
production, and a silent change sends the agent back through certification.